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1. Introduction 
    For more than three decades since its debut in 1980, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has ravaged Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) with a devastating mortality burden especially frightening young adults of 
both sexes. However, in the last few years the epidemic seems to have finally entered a declining 
phase (UNAIDS, 2018) thanks to the massive efforts aiming to (i) expand HIV testing to make 
seropositive people (i.e., people in the HIV stage) aware of their serostatus, (ii) increase the number 
of seropositive and sick people (i.e., people with full blown AIDS stage) accessing effective 
antiretroviral therapies (ART), and (iii) maintain high rates of population awareness on AIDS risks, 
by continuing and extending ongoing prevention and screening campaigns. For example, in 2016 
the proportion of people accessing ART amongst those living with HIV in the overall SSA region 
reached the level of 54% (though with large inter- and intra-country variation) compared to 
essentially none 10 years before. This is a great success that, compared to 2004-2005, representing 
the epoch of the AIDS-related mortality peak in SSA, has contributed to nearly halve AIDS 
mortality over a span of one decade (UNAIDS, 2017). Indeed, this has radically changed overall 
perspectives of AIDS control in SSA, as summarised in the so-called 90-90-90 plan launched by the 
UN in 2014 (UNAIDS, 2017), upon which the slogan “ending AIDS by 2030” was coined 
(UNAIDS, 2017) – referring to a major reduction in incidence and obviously not to disease 
eradication. 
    Clearly, going beyond the current – already burning – debate about the feasibility of the 90-90-90 
plan (Levi et al., 2016), the success achieved so far should not let us forget that AIDS currently 
remains the second main cause of mortality in SSA (WHO, 2017), with a huge number of 
seropositive individuals unaware of their serostatus (UNAIDS, 2017) and therefore able to continue 
to transmit the infection to others for a long time, suggesting that the battle is only initiated. In 
relation to this, several challenges have arisen, whose outcomes are surrounded by large 
uncertainties. In our opinion, these include (amongst others) three strictly inter-related areas at the 
interplay of epidemiology and public health on one hand, and demo-economics on the other hand, 
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deserving maximal attention by scholars and policy makers. The first one deals with the ultimate 
impact of HIV on the fertility transition in SSA and its consequences for economic development. 
The second regards the dramatic amount of resources that will have to be mobilised at both the 
national and international levels for successfully winning the AIDS battle, and its ambiguous effect 
on economic development (WHO, 2018). The third one – perhaps the true major challenge – deals 
with the emergence of resistance to HIV treatment (Hamers et al., 2018), whose effects are at 
present largely uncertain. These effects, which might be reasonably kept under control in 
industrialised countries, where HIV epidemics are mild, might reveal devastating in SSA by 
dramatically worsening the first two threats and eventually questioning the current optimism in the 
fight against AIDS (Hamers et al., 2018, Phillips et al 2017). 
    Amongst the three challenges, the first one on the eventual impact of HIV on the fertility 
transition in SSA and economic development has already been the object of a sustained debate 
amongst economists, with two dramatically opposite positions. On one extreme, Young (2005, 
2007) concluded that AIDS is contributing to lowering fertility in sub-Saharan Africa, and although 
representing a humanitarian disaster, does not cause an economic disaster. Rather, AIDS will allow 
future SSA generations to enjoy higher welfare than current generations thanks to the increase in 
the capital- and output-labour ratios because of AIDS mortality’s impact on labour supply that will 
dominate the main negative effect of HIV namely, the disruption of human capital. At the other 
extreme, (Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan, 2011) and (Kalemli-Ozcan, 2012) were first in corroborating 
an earlier intuition by Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) that HIV has the potential to reverse the fertility 
transition in SSA. In particular (Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan, 2011) revisited Young’s (2005, 2007) 
analyses using the same data and concluded that “the effect of HIV prevalence on fertility turns out 
to be positive”. Moreover, Kalemli-Ozcan (2012, p. 891) empirically showed the potential for HIV 
to reverse the fertility transition in SSA via both a positive direct effect on the quantity of children 
and a negative effect on the quality of children because of the existence of a negative correlation 
between HIV prevalence and school enrolment, and explained this phenomenon with the upward 
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pressure that the mortality upturn due to AIDS causes on the precautionary demand for children 
(quantity) and to the downward pressure on the demand for their education (quality). Within these 
two extreme positions there exists an entire spectrum of intermediate ones, which are reviewed in 
Gori et al. (2017). 
    On the previous topic, we have investigated (Gori et al., 2017) the possible consequences of the 
HIV epidemics on the fertility transition in SSA by using a novel model integrating an explicit 
dynamics of a fatal epidemics along the formulation firstly proposed in Chakraborty et al. (2010, 
2016) into a basic Unified Growth Theory (UGT) general equilibrium model (Galor and Weil, 
2000; Galor, 2011) including only human capital accumulation, to capture the main feature of the 
HIV context in SSA, and endogenous fertility and child and adult survival. Child and adult 
mortality schedules were made dependent on both human capital accumulation, to mirror the pre-
AIDS mortality transition, and the HIV prevalence to capture the additional effects of HIV/AIDS-
related mortality. The aim was to track the ultimate consequences – at the general equilibrium level 
– of the fall in education and human capital accumulation following the HIV-related blow-up of 
mortality amongst young adults on the quantity-quality switch, and therefore the fertility transition, 
in SSA. By choosing a parametrisation of SSA mortality allowing an appropriate balance between 
the time scales of the demographic transition and AIDS spread, we indeed concluded that an HIV-
induced stall (or even a reversal) of the fertility transition is a potentially robust phenomenon that, 
even under reasonably optimistic hypotheses on the timing and effects of AIDS control, might delay 
the trajectory of fertility in SSA of several decades thus compromising economic development in 
the region. These results bring theoretical evidence to the findings supporting the fertility “reversal” 
hypothesis, formulated first by Kalemli-Ozcan (2012) and Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2011) (see 
Gori et al., 2017, and references therein). 
    The possibility that the fertility transition in SSA might be paralysed by HIV makes it imperative 
to rapidly bring the epidemics under full control, thereby yielding to the second challenge above. 
Indeed, successfully fighting this battle will in turn call for unprecedented further mobilisation of 
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resources specifically devoted to fight HIV/AIDS in the short as well as in the medium and long 
terms. Recent estimates (Collier and Sterck, 2018) indicate that, given current high costs of a single 
therapy, the overall economic cost of generalised lifelong HIV treatment in the poorest SSA 
countries would be in the range of 80% of current GDP! The magnitude of this figure can hardly be 
covered by a massive expansion of international donations, representing the main funding source of 
the intervention against HIV carried out in SSA so far (UNAIDS, 2017). As was noted by Resch et 
al. (2015) and Remme et al. (2016) – based on current perspectives –, international aids might not 
be able to expand significantly beyond current levels. On the other hand, in the light of the dramatic 
extent of foreign financing of the AIDS response, which has reached levels above 90% of total 
AIDS funding in low income countries in 2013, there have been concerns about the fact that an HIV 
response completely dependent on external resources might have potentially destabilising effects on 
the afflicted countries (Mohiddin and Johnston, 2006; UNAIDS, 2013). 
    The previous considerations therefore highlight not only the need for massive resources 
deployment but also the delicate balance between foreign aid and the ability, for HIV afflicted SSA 
countries, to develop an autonomous endogenous response to AIDS. This is a major challenge 
whose response depend from an endless list of factors including primarily: (i) the magnitude of the 
HIV epidemic, (ii) the stage of economic development in the afflicted country and its perspectives 
for GDP growth in the medium term, (iii) the threats from other diseases, first of all malaria and 
TB, that in turn require allocation of large significant quotas of GDP, (iv) the ability to develop new 
financial tools to face the HIV challenge (Resch et al., 2015; Atun et al., 2016A; Remme et al., 
2016). These complicate questions have already raised a tough debate in the areas of public health 
and health economics (Katz et al., 2014; Resch et al., 2015; Atun et al., 2016B; Remme et al., 
2016). 
    On this topic, in a different work (Gori et al., 2018) we have initiated an investigation of the 
macro-economic dynamic implications of the affordability (by the government of HIV-afflicted 
countries) of control programmes mainly relying on public domestic expenditure. In that article, 
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also motivated by the need to provide a well-funded formulation of intervention against HIV (taken 
as fully exogenous in Gori et al. (2017) we used a simplified OLG macroeconomic framework à la 
Diamond (1965) with endogenous population and endogenous HIV transmission. About the latter, 
we represented the intervention against HIV by modelling the probability of transmission of HIV 
infection per single sexual contact as the sum of an endogenous component, representing public 
expenditure (financed at a balanced budget) specifically targeted to fight against HIV, and of an 
exogenous component reflecting international donations. 
    The main aim of the present work is to go one step further compared to both Gori et al. (2017) 
and Gori et al. (2018) by superimposing to the standard Diamond setup also private education and 
human capital accumulation, thereby enabling us to tackle the issue of HIV spread and control in a 
model with the quantity-quality trade off and consequently capable to also offer predictions on the 
fertility issue as well. For the macroeconomic component of the model we adopt a UGT-like 
structure along the lines of the contribution of Yakita (2010) with both physical and human capital 
accumulation. This macroeconomic setup is combined with an endogenous representation of the 
transmission and control of HIV/AIDS following the pioneering works of Chakraborty et al. (2010, 
2016), who were first in proposing an explicit representation of the transmission process into an 
OLG model. However, unlike Chakraborty and co-authors, whose agents optimally chose their 
private health preventive expenditure against HIV, in our formulation the transmission probability 
is determined by (i) the public interventions managed by the government of the afflicted country, 
(ii) foreign aid donations, which historically have represented the main channel of interventions 
carried out so far in SSA, (iii) a component tuning the positive impact of private education on the 
awareness of being at risk and ultimately capable to enhance the ongoing policies. Foreign aids are 
assumed to be scaled by the two main factors that should drove international programmes in SSA, 
namely the rate of HIV prevalence and per capita income of the afflicted country, although it is 
documented that GDP has been the main driver of the intervention while prevalence seemingly 
played a secondary role (Haacker, 2009; UNAIDS, 2017). Compared to the formulation adopted in 
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Chakraborty et al. (2016), which is clearly well suited for settings where financial markets are 
adequately developed, we believe that ours can better fit the current context of HIV in SSA, which 
is – with the sole exception of South Africa – the poorest region worldwide with inadequate health 
infrastructures, severe shortages of physicians and medicines, low education and poor health 
(UNDP, 2018) causing the highest mortality setting worldwide even in the absence of HIV. 
    Our formulation inherits the growth structure from Yakita (2010) showing the two development 
regimes characterising UGT growth models (e.g., Galor and Weil, 2000; Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002; de 
la Croix and Doepke, 2003, 2004; Galor, 2011), that is an initial exogenous growth phase 
(representing the paradigm of the poverty trap), where private education does not play any role and 
there exists only a precautionary demand for children, and a subsequent endogenous growth phase 
where education promotes the quantity-quality switch, which in turn plays a critical role in both 
human capital accumulation and economic development. However, the inclusion of the endogenous 
dynamics of HIV generates a rich interplay amongst the macroeconomic set up, the diseases and its 
possible intervention strategies, which have the potential to affect in a complicate manner the 
possibility to switch between the two development regimes as well as to promote significant 
quantitative differences within each of them. Additionally, thanks to the flexibility of our 
formulation of control strategies (public policy versus donors versus private education) the model 
allows to pinpoint a rich number of endogenous policy options that can be used by the afflicted 
country in the battle against the HIV disease, which however can have profoundly different impacts 
on the development regimes depending on the specific mix of the interventions adopted. 
    On one hand, high levels of HIV prevalence have the potential to relegate the economy in its 
poverty trap, where the lack of ability to sustain education makes unavoidable the need for 
international foreign aid donations. Obviously, in low-resource settings, that is countries already 
entrapped in poverty, AIDS can dramatically worsen the conditions for escaping underdevelopment. 
On the other hand, lower levels of HIV prevalence and/or the ability to effectively control the 
epidemics can promote the escape from the poverty trap, entering a regime where the development 
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of education and the accumulation of human capital make available further tools for successfully 
fighting the disease, eventually entering a virtuous circle where HIV-afflicted countries can afford 
to successfully fight the battle exclusively with internal resources. Unlike Young (2005), this model 
shows that the increase in adult mortality due to HIV/AIDS can represent a serious threat to 
economic development by its upward pressure on the precautionary demand for children and 
downward pressure on education, as first stressed by Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), which in turn can 
dramatically reduce physical and human capital accumulation. 
    The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the main facts about the 
demographic and economic impact of the HIVAIDS epidemic in SSA, with a special emphasis on 
the critical issue of funding HIV control programmes. Section 3 presents the macro-economic 
dynamic framework. Section 4 studies the dynamics of the model. Section 5 reports and discusses 
the main results of the work. Section 6 outlines the main conclusions. 
 
2. HIV/AIDS in SSA: natural history, mortality, fertility, and the demographic transition 
2.1. Global facts about HIV/AIDS 
    Several scholars have identified the still dramatic levels of mortality, with the highest toll from 
communicable diseases worldwide, and the underlying poor health conditions, as the major issue 
responsible for the underdevelopment in SSA (e.g., Bloom and Canning, 2004; Lorentzen et al., 
2008). Notwithstanding these tragic circumstances, SSA countries were able to achieve continued 
(though slow) progresses in life expectancy until the early 1980 i.e., prior the HIV/AIDS initiated to 
ravage the region yielding a tragedy of major proportions. 
    While in several other regions of the world the HIV epidemics remained confined for years in 
special and therefore relatively small risk groups such as men having sex with men, intravenous 
drug users, and blood transfused, since the very beginning of the pandemics the spread of HIV in 
SSA was mainly driven by heterosexual transmission in the young adult population thereby 
favouring high rates of disease spread as well as large rates of vertical transmission to new-born 
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children from infected mothers. Fast diffusion was further enhanced by a number of factors highly 
specific to the context of SSA including high rates of sexual partner change, high rates of prostitute 
attendance, almost no use of protections during sexual intercourse, large human mobility due to 
seasonal works, sporadic and largely ineffective awareness campaigns – with a few notable 
exceptions – such as the Ugandan case (Green et al 2006) – up to the phenomenon of AIDS 
denialism, which in some cases, as that of South-Africa, was unbelievably promoted at the highest 
policy level, namely by the country prime minister (Fassin and Schneider, 2003, Simelela and 
Venter, 2014). These circumstances allowed HIV to reach large prevalence levels in several SSA 
countries, thereby causing AIDS to rapidly emerge – and to remain for about 25 years – the leading 
cause of mortality (UNAIDS, 2017). 
    The updated UNAIDS central estimates (UNAIDS, 2017) document that HIV/AIDS - by far the 
major pandemic of the current epoch, with 76 million people infected by HIV and 35 million died 
from AIDS related illnesses (primarily Tuberculosis) since the onset of the epidemic in the late 
seventies up to 2016 – has devastated SSA. Still in 2016, out of a total of 36.7 million people living 
with HIV worldwide, with an incidence of about 1.8 million new HIV infections and 1 million 
deaths from AIDS-related illnesses, SSA – which in the same period was homing 13% of the world 
population – accounted for 25.5 million people living with HIV, i.e. 70% of total HIV prevalence 
worldwide, for 64.5% of new infections, for 73% of total estimated deaths from AIDS, and for 
85,5% new infections among children (UNAIDS, 2017). However, these figures represent a 
dramatic decline (-42%) compared to the disease peak phase occurred between 2001 and 2005, 
when the number of AIDS-related deaths in SSA was in the region of 1.7 million per year. The 
factors underlining this decline are complicate and include awareness campaigns – that essentially 
represented the only available weapon against the infection until 2005 – aimed to reduce risky 
behaviour, possible saturation effects in the at-risk population – and the growing access of SSA 
population to antiretroviral treatments. Considering that essentially no treatments were available in 
SSA still in 2005, progresses have been dramatic: in 2016 about 50% of those living with HIV in 
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SSA were accessing to therapies though with large regional disparities (about 60% in southern and 
eastern Africa vs only 35% in western and central Africa). 
 
2.2. Country-level epidemics 
    A major distinctive trait of HIV/AIDS in SSA, as by the way all over the world, is the marked 
heterogeneity in prevalence amongst different communities as clear from the temporal trends of 
country-level prevalence of HIV infection in the most afflicted countries (Fig. 1). For example, in 
Zimbabwe, that possibly suffered the most aggressive HIV epidemics worldwide with a peak in the 
region of 29% in the 1997-1998, the epidemics already entered in a declining phase since the 2000, 
thus well before the introduction of therapies. This has been primarily attributed to the success in 
the awareness campaigns conducted therein, which were subsequently reinforced by the spread of 
therapies (Halperin, 2013). However, in the recent years the prevalence curve seems stalling at 
levels still exceptionally high (more than 15%) suggesting that the battle is far from being won. A 
similar trend was observed in Botswana, and at lower prevalence regimes in Malawi and Namibia. 
Somewhat differently, in Swaziland (27,5% prevalence at 2014), Lesotho (23% prevalence at 2014) 
and South-Africa (about 19% prevalence at 2014), HIV prevalence has reached a plateau between 
2000 and 2005, remaining essentially constant or even slightly increasing thereafter. These slightly 
increasing trends also reflect the positive effects of therapies, which extend the duration of sojourn 
in the seropositive (i.e., HIV) phase, thereby increasing the size of the HIV population. Nonetheless, 
this effect is also illustrative of the complexities of intervention against HIV: any success of 
therapies in delaying the transition to full-blown AIDS disease has the effect of increasing the size 
of the HIV population. As the latter includes individuals in good health state and infective, that is 
capable to retransmit the infection to others, efforts to keep awareness high and ensure safe sexual 
behaviour will require a lot of effort in the very long-term. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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2.3. HIV/AIDS and life expectancy 
    The growth in HIV prevalence curves, followed with a delay of some years, by the corresponding 
growth in full-blown AIDS prevalence curves, and ensuing rapid death (in the absence of therapies) 
was mirrored by a dramatic impact on life expectancy all over SSA but especially in countries with 
large HIV epidemics. Figure 2 reports UN (2017) medium variant estimates and projections for the 
post-1950 trend in the life expectancy at age 15 (e15) in the SSA countries suffering the most severe 
HIV epidemics (as reported in Figure 1). Life expectancy at age 15 was chosen as representative of 
the expected lifespan for individuals entering young adulthood in SSA. As previously stated, 
HIV/AIDS was able to dramatically reverse the long-lasting – though slow – increasing trend in life 
expectancy showed everywhere in SSA. In the worst epidemics, in Zimbabwe, the life expectancy 
at age 15 that was estimated in the range of 54 years between 1985-1990 i.e., before the onset of 
HIV/AIDS, fell between 2000 and 2005 (that is, as expected, a few years after the predicted peak in 
prevalence reported in Figure 1) to a level only slightly in excess of 30 years. Though the decline in 
HIV prevalence observed in Zimbabwe in subsequent years is predicted to allow life expectancy to 
return to the pre-AIDS levels already by 2015-2020, things are dramatically different in other 
contexts. For example, in Lesotho and Swaziland e15 is projected by the UN medium variant to 
remain substantially below its pre-AIDS level for decades, and to return to it only between 2060 
and 2070 (Fig. 1b). Which will be the ultimate consequences of the persistent fall in life expectancy 
for young adults on economic decisions (e.g., investment in children and their education) is 
presently unclear. Surely, mortality decline has represented the major trigger of the fertility 
transition in both conventional demographic explanations (Bongaarts and Casterline, 2012; Livi-
Bacci, 2017), emphasising fertility decline as a direct homeostatic response to increasing survival, 
and modern demo-economic theories (Galor, 2011), emphasising the endogenous nature of 
mortality decline which promoted investments in education, thus favouring the switch in children’s 
demand from “quantity” (Malthusian growth regime) to “quality” (modern growth regime). 
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Focusing on the role played by the exceptionally high mortality of adults in SSA, Lorentzen et al. 
(2008) showed that it was the main cause of the collapsed economic growth and development in the 
region via shortening time horizons, increasing risky behaviours and eventually raising fertility. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
2.4. HIV/AIDS and the fertility transition 
    The issue of the possible effects of HIV/AIDS on fertility decisions in SSA raised in the previous 
section, is currently the object of a tough debate in the recent empirical economic literature.i The 
resulting conclusions are however dramatically variable, with some studies suggesting that AIDS 
mortality is already having a substantial positive effect on fertility in SSA and others predicting that 
AIDS is not having any effects or even lowering fertility in SSA (an extensive literature review on 
the subject is reported in Gori et al., 2017). 
    As remarked by influential scholars (Bongaarts and Casterline, 2012), the fertility transition in 
SSA has been dramatically delayed (the most dramatic evidence is represented by the case of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Romaniuk, 2011) compared to other world regions started from 
similar initial conditions, such as Asia and the Latin America (Bongaarts and Casterline, 2012). In 
this general context, a worrying news has been represented by the generalised slowing down of 
fertility decline in the early 2000’s (Schoumaker, 2009) and especially by the symptoms of stalling 
or even relapsing fertility in the group of countries suffering the most severe HIV/AIDS epidemics, 
which notably were SSA leaders in fertility decline at the onset of the HIV epidemics, according to 
UN data (UN, 2017). Additionally, in South Africa, where fertility was decreasing since already 
1950, the decline was dramatically slowed down after HIV prevalence became substantial in the 
1980’s. This is a remarkable fact since, on the contrary, in SSA countries suffering intermediate 
HIV epidemics (e.g., Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique and Kenya), fertility decline slowed down 
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during 1995-2005 but accelerated thereafter (UN, 2017), while no slowing down was observed in 
countries suffering mild epidemics. 
    Though these are just temporal associations based on aggregate data, the possibility that the 
persistent mortality blow-up due to AIDS might cause a paralysis or even a reversal in the fertility 
transition in SSA might have such dramatic implications for the development of the region so to 
represent, in our opinion, one of the major conundra for current economic development studies. 
 
3. The model 
    This section builds on a modified version with HIV spread of the growth model of Yakita (2010) 
with physical and human capital accumulation. The OLG (general equilibrium) closed economy is 
populated by a continuum of finite-lived (perfectly) rational and identical individuals of size 
tN  per 
generation ( 0,1,2,...t =  is the time index). The length of each generation is conventionally set at 25 
years. The life of the typical agent belonging to generation t  is divided into childhood, young 
adulthood and old age. As a child, an individual does not make any economic decisions and directly 
consumes resources in the parent’s household, while also receiving education from his parents. We 
consequently avoid including AIDS-related child mortality in the model as justified by the fact that 
the AIDS-mortality burden amongst children (following by vertically transmitted AIDS) is steadily 
decreasing thanks to pre-natal treatments, and anyhow second-order compared to AIDS-related 
adult mortality in SSA (UNAIDS, 2018). Therefore, we only consider the children surviving at the 
entry of adulthood (
tn ) as the key variable of the model (Galor and Weil, 1996; Gori and Sodini, 
2019). As a young adult, an individual is economically and sexually active. He works, saves, gives 
birth and takes care of children, and may also acquire HIV infection. The HIV spread follows the 
rule developed by Chakraborty et al. (2016), which will be clarified below. In addition, he invests 
the amount 
te  per child for educational purposes of their children. When young, an individual is 
endowed with 1 unit of time. We assume that raising children is a purely time-consuming activity 
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(see Guryan et al., 2008 for empirical evidence). The child rearing technology requires a positive 
exogenous fraction 0z   of the parent’s time endowment to raise a child (representing parent’s 
foregone earnings), i.e. the time required to care for children cannot be spent working. As 
tn  
represents the number of surviving children at time t , tzn  is the time needed to care for tn  
descendants of a parent that belongs to generation t . This implies that the opportunity cost of 
children is proportional to the wage rate per effective labour (
tw ), which is provided to firms for 
production purposes. Therefore, the budget constraint when young reads as follows: 
 (1 )(1 )t t t t t ts e n zn w h+ = − − , (1) 
where 
ts  is saving, t te n  is the total private expenditure that parents devote to educate their own tn  
children, 0 1   is the constant labour income tax rate levied by the government to finance a 
public expenditure specifically devoted to fight HIV, and 
t tw h  is the total labour income of an 
individual of the working-age generation who has th  efficient units of human capital. Of course, the 
condition 1/tn z  should always hold to guarantee economic feasibility. 
    By following Yakita (2010), the labour productivity of a young adult individual is given by the 
stock of human capital endowed at the beginning of the working period. The stock of human capital 
of an individual belonging to the next (working-age) generation (
1th + ) depends on the educational 
expenditure per child provided by the current working-age generation to their children (
te ) and the 
existing stock of human capital ( th ). The human capital accumulation rule therefore is the 
following: 
 
1
1 ( ) , , 0, 0 1tt t th e h h
    
−
+ = +    , (2) 
where th  is the average or economy-wide stock of human capital reflecting the spillovers from the 
society at time t ,   is a scaling parameter,   is the constant elasticity of the overall private 
component t te h+  in human capital accumulation. This term t te h+  implies perfect 
substitutability in the process of human capital accumulation between the expenditure in education 
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provided by parents to children and the ability of children to absorb knowledge by looking at their 
own parents at work (parental background). This ability is tuned by the positive parameter 0   
(see Yakita, 2010 for details). 
    The survival probability of a young adult agent belonging to generation t , 0 1t  , is 
endogenous and determined by his individual state of health. The existence of HIV/AIDS makes the 
individual health status worse off so that adult survival negatively depends on the prevalence rate of 
HIV infection ti , representing the proportion of agents infected at time t . We assume that this 
probability has the following simplified form: 
 (1 )t A ti = − , (3) 
where 1A   represents (exogenous) survival from causes of death different from AIDS. This 
formulation is obviously over-simplified, but it aims to reflect the well documented facts that prior 
to the HIV/AIDS crisis: 1) life expectancies at all ages were increasing everywhere in SSA (UN, 
2017), despite the dramatic burden of mortality claimed by other communicable diseases such as 
malaria and tuberculosis; 2) HIV/AIDS has represented for three decades the most important cause 
of death in SSA. The purpose of the formulation of endogenous survival implicit in Eq. (3) is to 
reflect the role of premature death of adults due to HIV/AIDS as the dominant effect of the 
epidemic at the macroeconomic level. We are aware that there are several other important effects of 
HIV, first the burden of child mortality through vertical transmission. Although dramatically 
relevant from a humanitarian point of view, this factor does not affect the structure of the model as 
it deals with non-economically active agents (children). 
    Young adults may acquire HIV infection by sexual transmission only. The probability tp  that an 
HIV-susceptible agent will become infected is defined as follows (Chakraborty et al., 2016): 
 1 (1 )t ttp i
−= − . (4) 
where 0 1t   is the probability of acquiring the infection per sexual partnership and 0   is the 
average number of sexual encounters that a young agent has during his entire adulthood. If the 
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population is large, the prevalence rate at time t  amongst young adults converges to the probability 
that a young adult agent can be HIV-infected, i.e. 1tti p −=  for any t . In this model, the probability 
t  of acquiring HIV per sexual partnership negatively is assumed to depend on three main factors, 
which are: (i) private education (
te ) that contributes to raise individual awareness against the risk of 
HIV infection and therefore promotes subsequent actions such as the use of protections during 
sexual intercourse, (ii) public interventions, which are endogenously managed by the government of 
the afflicted country, that are provided in the model on a per worker basis ( tg ),
ii and (iii) foreign aid 
donations that are instead provided on a per young basis ( td ). The last component is assumed to 
depend on two main factors that should drive international programmes in SSA, namely the rate of 
HIV prevalence and the GDP of the afflicted country (Haacker, 2009), which is measured on a per 
young basis for analytical convenience. We will turn to the specifics of all these three components 
affecting t  later in this chapter. Then, 
 
*1 ( )
A
t
B t t tqe g d




+ + +
= . (5) 
where 0   is a parameter that controls the degree of effectiveness of the overall amount of 
resources aimed at fighting the HIV disease, 0 1A   ( 1/A  ), 0B   and 
* : /t t t te e w h=  is the 
expenditure per child over the individual total income and 0q   represents the relative weight of 
the educational component in reducing the probability of acquiring HIV per sexual partnership. 
    If an individual survives at the onset of old age, his material consumption is based on 
accumulated saving. The existence of a perfect market for annuities allows an agent to make his 
own saving being intermediated through mutual funds. This assumption follows a recent established 
literature on endogenous lifetime in growth models dealing with economic development issues 
(Chakraborty, 2004; Fanti and Gori, 2014; Chakraborty et al., 2016), and implies that the savings of 
those who prematurely die (due to AIDS in this context) are allocated amongst those who are still 
alive.iii Therefore, old-age material consumption ( 1tc + ) is constrained by the capitalised amount of 
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resources saved when young divided by the survival probability of a young person of generation t , 
that is: 
 11t t
t
e
tc
R
s

+
+ = , (6) 
where 1
e
tR +  is the interest factor that individuals of generation t  expect will prevail at time 1t + . 
    The individual representative of generation t  has preferences toward the number of children 
when young and material consumption and the quality of children (represented by the human capital 
accumulated through education) when he will be old. Therefore, the expected lifetime utility 
function has the following form: 
 
1 1ln( ) [ln( ) ln( )]t t t t tU n c h + += + + , (7) 
where 0   measures the relative degree of altruism towards (the quality of) children and t , 
which resembles the subjective discount rate, is given by the expression in (3) and then it is 
negatively affected by the prevalence rate of the HIV disease, ti . In other words, an increase in ti  
causes an increase in adult mortality (i.e., a reduction in the intertemporal discount factor) and this 
in turn implies that individuals of generation t  reduce the relative importance (in the utility 
function) of consuming material goods and enjoying having educated children when old because 
they live shorter. By taking as given factor prices, the tax rate and the prevalence rate of HIV, the 
representative agent maximises the expected lifetime utility function in (7) with respect to material 
consumption (
1tc + ), the number of children ( tn ) and the amount of educational expenditure per 
child (
te ) subject to the lifetime budget constraint 
 1
1
(1 )(1 ) t
t
e
t
t
t t t t
c
e n z
R
n w h

+
+
+ = − − , (8) 
obtained by combining (1) and (6). Then, he gets the following optimal values for the saving rate 
ts , the number (precautionary demand) of children tn  and the quality (education) of children te :
iv 
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(1 )
1
t t t
t
t
w h
s
 

−
=
+
, (9) 
 
1
(1 )
(1 )(1 )
(1 )[ (1 ) ]
t t
t
t
t t
t t
t t
w w
z
n
w
w w
z w

  
  

 +
= 
− − 
 + − −
, (10) 
and 
 
0
[ (1 ) ]
1
t t
t t t t
t
t
if w w
e h z w
if w w
   
 


= − −
 −
, (11) 
where :
(1 )
t
t
w
z

  
=
−
 is the threshold value of the wage rate per effective labour above which 
the representative individual has an incentive to invest in child quality. We note that the condition 
t tw w  also guarantees a positive value of the precautionary demand for children. For details 
regarding the discussion of marginal benefits and costs of investing in child quality see Yakita 
(2010). A specific feature of our model in comparison with the one developed by Yakita (2010) is 
the role played by the survival probability t  on the critical value tw  that discriminates between the 
corner solution (a state in which parents do not want to invest in child quality) and the interior 
solution (a state in which parents are likely to spend on education of their children rather than 
having more children). As t  negatively depends on ti , it is straightforward to see that an increase 
in the rate of HIV prevalence reduces the survival probability of adults by increasing tw  thus 
making less convenient investing in education, as the marginal cost of educating children increases. 
This model therefore includes the quantity-quality trade-off as well as the substitutability between 
education provided by parents and intergenerational human capital transmission within the family in 
the process of human capital accumulation in presence of an endogenous mechanism of HIV 
transmission. These are reasonable ingredients to characterise SSA economies. 
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    At time t , the government provides the amount tG  of public expenditure to fight HIV. The term 
tG  therefore includes any type of relevant actions such as building health infrastructures, providing 
effective antiretroviral therapies (ART) for seropositive and AIDS-sick individuals, physicians and 
medicines, promoting awareness on the risk of infections and therefore the adoption of safe sexual 
practices such as e.g. the use of condoms and so on, with the purpose to reduce the probability of 
acquiring HIV per sexual partnership.v These expenditures are devoted to young-adult people, 
which are the ones who are HIV-susceptible and may then acquire HIV through sexual 
transmission. The HIV spending is financed by the government of the afflicted country at a 
balanced budget through labour income taxation. As the tax rate is 0 1  , the total amount of tax 
revenues is 
t tw L , where tL  is the quantity of effective labour employed. Defining now 
: /t t tg G L=  as the amount of public expenditure per worker, the government accounting rule at a 
balanced budget is the following: 
 t tg w= . (12) 
    In addition to the public (internal) HIV-related expenditure, there exist external resources 
provided by international organisations (e.g., UN and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation) to high 
HIV-prevalent SSA countries. These resources (defined on a per young basis) depend on the GDP 
of the afflicted country (UNAIDS, 2018) and the rate of HIV prevalence according to the following 
rule: 
 
( / )
0 ( / )
t t t t
t
t t
ai by if i b a y
d
if i b a y
− 
= 

, (13) 
where , 0a b   are the share of external resources devoted to each single HIV-afflicted individual at 
time t  (based on the rate of HIV prevalence) and the share of external resources per head devoted 
to each young living at time t  (based on income), respectively. The rule in (13) implies that 
international organisations increase foreign aid in SSA as HIV prevalence increases and reduce it as 
the HIV-afflicted country gets richer. When the HIV prevalence in one country is large (resp. small) 
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enough, external donations are based on a mix between the two quotas discussed above (resp. 
become null). In the last case, the fight against the HIV/AIDS disease is entirely based on internal 
resources of the afflicted country, which then becomes fully autonomous in the battle against HIV, 
according to the auspices raised by the deputy director of UNAIDS (UNAIDS, 2013). 
    As individuals are identical, the condition t th h=  holds in a symmetric equilibrium. Therefore, 
depending on the level of education coming from the interior or corner solution in (11) of the 
individual optimisation problem, human capital accumulation (2) becomes the following: 
 1 (1 )
( )
1
t t t
t
t
t t t
t
h if w w
h z w
h if w w




 
  
 
+
 

=   − −
  
− 
. (14) 
When the wage is small enough (
t tw w ) parents choose to do not provide education to their 
children. In this case, the human capital growth rate is constant and depends only on parental 
background. It may grow indefinitely, shrink or follow a stationary pathway depending on whether 
the term   is larger than, smaller than or equal to one, respectively. In contrast, when the wage is 
large enough (
t tw w ) there exists a child quantity-quality trade-off as parents want to provide 
education to their children and the growth rate of human capital depends on the wage rate per 
effective labour. 
    Regarding the production side of the economy, firms are identical and act competitively on the 
market. The time- t  representative firm produces a homogeneous good 
tY  by combining physical 
capital 
tK  and the amount tL  of effective labour. These inputs are combined by using a Cobb-
Douglas technology with constant returns to scale, that is: 
 
1 , 0 1t t tY K L
  −=   . (15) 
The temporary equilibrium condition in the labour market at time t  is determined by equating 
labour demand and labour supply, that is (1 )t t t tL zn h N= − . By assuming full depreciation of 
capital, a unit price of output and taking factor prices as given, profit maximisation by the 
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representative firm implies that the wage rate and the interest factor are equal to the marginal 
product of efficient labour and the marginal product of capital, respectively, that is: 
 (1 ) (1 )t t tw v zn
  −= − − , (16) 
and 
 
1 1(1 )t t tR v zn
  − −= − , (17) 
where : /t t tv k h=  is the physical to human capital ratio, : /t t tk K N=  is the stock of physical capital 
per young person and GDP per young person is defined as 
1: / (1 )t t t t ty Y N v zn
 −= = − . 
    Equilibrium in the capital market is determined by equating aggregate saving by the 
representative individual and aggregate investment by the representative firm, that is 
t tS I= . The 
inter-temporal equilibrium condition in the capital market requires that the aggregate capital stock 
installed at time 1t +  is equal to the gross aggregate investment at time t . As physical capital fully 
depreciates at the end of each period, we get 1t t t t tK I S s N+ = = = . Knowing that 1 1 1:t t tK k N+ + +=  and 
1t t tN n N+ = , equilibrium is characterised as follows: 
 1
t
t
t
s
k
n
+ = . (18) 
    For the sake of simplicity, from the next section we set the constant A  (representing survival 
from causes of death different from AIDS) to one, as in this context it merely represents a scaling 
parameter without relevant qualitative effects. 
 
4. Main theoretical predictions 
    Depending on the size of the wage rate tw  compared to the threshold tw , there exist two different 
development regimes, as in Yakita (2010). If individuals are relatively poor (
t tw w ), the economy 
is entrapped in a phase of underdevelopment. If they become richer (
t tw w ), the economy may 
follow a sustained development trajectory. 
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(1) [Underdevelopment, 
t tw w ]. The individual optimal choices are described by the saving 
function defined in (9) as well as by the values of the first expression of tn  and te  in (10) and (11), 
respectively. In this regime, individuals do not invest in education and there exists only a 
precautionary demand for children. By using the same strategy of Yakita (2010), it is possible to 
study the evolution of the physical to human capital ratio and the HIV prevalence through the 
following map 
1M  defined in the variables tv  and ti , that is 
 
1
1
1
1
2
1 1
1 (
(
(
)
1 )(1 )
(1 ) )
:
t t t t
t
A
t
B t t
z
v v i i
M
i
d
i
g
  



 



− −
+
+
− −
= − −


  =    
−
+
−
+
, (19) 
where 
2
(1 )
1
t
t t t
t
i
g w v
i

  
 −
= = −  
− 
 is the amount of internal public spending against HIV on a 
per worker basis and foreign aid td  is defined in (13). If foreign aids and/or the internal public 
health are strong enough to eliminate HIV in the phase of underdevelopment, the model essentially 
falls within the one-dimensional system studied by Yakita (2010), in which the evolution of all the 
variables can be characterised by studying the dynamics of 
tv . 
    Unfortunately, studying system (19) is not an easy task as it cannot be dealt with in a neat 
analytical form. Indeed, it can exhibit a plethora of stationary states with positive values of the HIV 
prevalence ( 0ti  ) in addition to the one characterised by the absence of HIV/AIDS ( 0ti = ). In this 
regard, we must distinguish between the case in which international organisations devote resources 
in the fight against HIV, ˆt tv v , to the case in which foreign aids are absent, ˆt tv v , where 
11
1
ˆ :
2
t t
t
t
ai i
v
b i


−
 − 
=   
−   
 represents the threshold value of the physical to human capital ratio that 
discriminates between international intervention and no international intervention, according to the 
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rule specified in (13). We recall that the existence of (one or more) stationary states in the 
underdevelopment regime is possible only whether the condition 
1
1
:
(1 ) (1 )(1 ) 2
t
t t
t t
i
v v
z i i

  
   −
 =   
− − − −   
 is satisfied, where tv  is evaluated at its stationary state 
value. This threshold is obtained by replacing tn  with its optimal value, through the first expression 
of Eq. (10), in the equation of the marginal product of efficient labour in (16) and using tw . In this 
regard, we recall that, apart from the infectious dynamics, a stationary state in this model can be 
related to unbounded growth of physical and human capital if 1   or to a situation where the 
human capital continuously reduces and the physical capital tends towards its stationary state level 
if 1   (see Yakita, 2010, for details). If the physical to human capital ratio is larger than the 
critical value tv , there exist no stationary states with a positive value of v  in the underdevelopment 
regime. The stability properties of the stationary states of the dynamic system (19) are studied by 
resorting to numerical analyses given the complexity of the expressions of the map. 
 
(2) [Sustained development, 
t tw w ]. In this case, the individual optimal choices are described by 
the saving function defined in (9) as well as by the values of the second expression of tn  and te  in 
(10) and (11), respectively. In this regime, individuals are rich enough to invest in education and 
therefore they decide to trade off child quantity against child quality. Then, equilibrium dynamics of 
tv  and ti  are described by the following map 2M : 
 2
1 *
1
1 1
2 (1 )
(1 )
(1 )
)
(1 ):
1 (1 )
1
1
1
1
(
t
t t
t t
t t
t
t t
t
t
A
t
B t t
i
i zn
v v
i v
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i
e
i z
g d
n
i


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



 


 


+
+
− −
 − −
 =
     −  − − −   − − −     

  =    +
− −
+ +
, (20) 
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where 
[ (1 ) ]
1
t t t
t
t
h z w
e
   
 
− −
=
−
, (1 ) (1 )t t t tg w v zn
    −= = − − , td  is defined in (13) and tn  is 
determined as the unique solution of 
[1 (1 ) ](1 )(1 ) (1 )
(2 )[ (1 )(1 ) (1 ) ]
t t t
t
t t t
i v zn
n
i z v zn
 
 
  
  
−
−
− − − − −
=
− − − − −
. Given the 
complexity of the dynamic system (20) and the problems related to the analytical tractability of 
characterising the possible switches between the two distinct regimes governed by maps 
1M  and 
2M , in what follows we will resort to numerical simulations to concentrate on some demo-
economic results of the model. In doing this, we will follow the methodology introduced by 
Chakraborty et al. (2010, 2016) by fixing the main parameters of the problem at economically 
meaningful values for SSA countries and then studying the effects of both internal and external 
health policies on the HIV prevalence, the economic dynamics and their (macroeconomic) 
interplay. 
 
5. Dynamics of the model and discussion of the main results 
    This section builds on a simulative exercise aiming at studying the economic and epidemiological 
dynamics characterised by Eqs. (19) and (20). The parameters of the model are chosen as follows: 
0.37 =  (Gollin, 2002), 0.535 = , 0.011 = , 22.3 =  (these values are similar to those used by 
Yakita, 2010), 1.52 = , 0.12z =  (assigned to obtain a fertility rate in line with SSA), 
0.0123A = , 35B = , 100 = , 0.1q =  and 1 =  (assigned to get an equilibrium prevalence rate 
of 35% in the case of an uncontrolled HIV in the phase of underdevelopment). 
    First, we considered an economy without the HIV disease that moves away (at time 3t = ) – 
thanks to human capital accumulation – from the underdevelopment regime, where parents did not 
invest in education and there existed only a precautionary demand for children, to a sustained 
development regime, where there is a child quantity-quality trade off. We have considered a 
parameterisation excluding the existence of poverty traps due to the initial conditions (history). This 
is because the main aim of the work is to stress the role of HIV in determining a fall back in 
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poverty. The economy begins with a situation where fertility is constant and fixed at 4.16 children 
per woman in a phase of underdevelopment, ending up in context of sustained development where 
each parent has 2.85 children on average. In this last regime, education helps reducing the 
precautionary demand for children by changing the marginal conditions for having an extra child. 
At 6t = , the HIV disease begins ( 6 0.01i = ) and the prevalence rate would reach 35% (in line with 
the values of some high-prevalent SSA countries) in the case of an uncontrolled spread. HIV is 
responsible for the falling back of the economy into a phase of underdevelopment due to a lowering 
life expectancy leading to a lower saving and higher fertility due to increased mortality by also 
reducing education to zero (child quality-quantity trade off). It is important to note that education 
has partially slowed down the development of HIV (clearly, education becomes zero when one falls 
back into the early stage of economic development). 
    An important role in addressing the humanitarian emergency due to HIV infection has been 
played by international aids from both private and public institutions (donors). In our simulative 
exercise, we calibrated these interventions by linking them positively to the prevalence rate and 
negatively to the income produced by the afflicted country (measured on a per young basis) 
according to the rule: the higher income, the lower international donations. Foreign aids start at 
48t =  when the HIV prevalence is almost 48 0.23i =  succeeding in bringing the amount of infected 
people in the afflicted country below the threshold of 1% and letting the economy move on a 
sustained development path with positive levels of education and lower fertility. Once donors are 
reset to zero because the prevalence rate has gone below the critical threshold ( ( / )t ti b a y= , which 
was set at 1% with 4a =  and 0.17b = ), we explored the possibility of an endogenous intervention 
by the government of the afflicted country aiming at replacing external aids with an internal policy 
financed by levying taxes on labour income ( 0.1 = ). We note that by setting the tax rate   at too 
high a level would greatly reduce individual disposable income and saving, which in turn reduce 
physical capital accumulation by also stimulating the precautionary demand for children. 
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Differently, setting the tax rate at too low a level would be ineffective and would make the disease 
spreading again. Therefore, the public expenditure against HIV initially causes a reduction in the 
demand for education (child quality) and increases fertility (child quantity) but at lower birth rates 
than those observed when the donors were active. This is because the direct negative effect on 
income due to labour income taxation is high and dominates the indirect positive effect of a lower 
HIV on mortality reduction. However, this taxation can be decreased over time, thus making the 
endogenous policy dynamically reactive and linked to the prevalence rates observed. Also, in this 
phase education plays a positive role and contributes to reducing both the number of children and 
HIV, but with a much lower intensity than in a pre-AIDS setting. We note, however, that long-term 
fertility is higher than the values observed in the (pre-AIDS) early stages of demographic transition. 
AIDS therefore represents a major cause depressing the development pathway of SSA countries 
(Figures 3 and 4). 
 
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
    For more than three decades, HIV/AIDS has ravaged SSA and still now is claiming dramatic toll 
of deaths. Nonetheless, the increasing diffusion of anti-retroviral therapies and awareness 
campaigns have finally downturned the epidemic curve and brought optimistic perspectives on the 
control of the disease, as summarised in the global 90-90-90 plan (UNAIDS, 2018) aiming to 
bringing AIDS under full control by 2030. However, the battle against HIV in SSA is far from its 
end and several challenges are still open. Amongst these, we believe that there are at least three 
major threats that are critical for their potential effects to economic development and therefore 
should deserve major attention at the highest policy level, that is (i) the potential for an HIV-
induced paralysis of the fertility transition, (ii) the need for a dramatic expansion of the amount of 
resources devoted to funding the interventions against HIV, and (iii) the unclear magnitude of the 
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emerging phenomenon of resistance to treatments. This work developed a macroeconomic dynamic 
framework capable to account for both the first two previously mentioned factors within a UGT-like 
growth set up. The model includes an explicit HIV transmission mechanism – as first proposed by 
Chakraborty et al. (2010, 2016) – and different funding rules of the interventions against HIV, 
covering almost all the kinds of interventions used in actual SSA countries. We believe that the 
explicit inclusion of the epidemic dynamics goes far enough beyond the possibility offered by 
models simply treating HIV as an exogenous mortality shock, as it allows to pinpoint the dynamic 
interplay between the time scales of the epidemics with those of fertility decline and, ultimately, of 
economic development. 
    Our main conclusions dramatically contrast Young’s (2005) results, according to which AIDS is 
a humanitarian disaster but not an economic disaster. Indeed, we found that HIV has the potential to 
constrain an economy in an underdevelopment regime with high HIV-prevalence rates and high 
fertility, or to worsen the conditions for being entrapped in poverty by reversing the long-term trend 
of fertility decline. The issue of the AIDS-induced fertility reversal is currently a controversial one. 
In Gori et al. (2017), we have surveyed several empirical contributions on the subject, showing a 
wide degree of disagreement in the responses, with a number of papers suggesting that HIV has a 
potential not only for stalling but also reversing the fertility transition in SSA, as first suggested in 
the seminal works of Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2011) and Kalemli-Ozcan (2012), and a similar 
number of papers reaching opposite conclusions. However, we found that countries suffering a 
combination of the following ingredients: 1) a stall in the fertility transition, 2) a large HIV 
epidemic, 3) negative perspectives on life expectancies requiring long intervals of time to restore 
the pre-AIDS levels, as is the case for example of Lesotho, should represent the highest priority for 
international interventions in SSA. We feel that this message is not so far at the top of the debate on 
the topic. On top of this, the present work has added the issue of the financing of the battle against 
HIV/AIDS. The model clearly enlightens the conditions under which an international intervention is 
necessary versus the circumstances that may allow afflicted countries to support the AIDS battle by 
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using internal resources without compromising the escape form the poverty trap. In this last case, 
private education might play a key role in the battle against HIV by enhancing the internal public 
policy, therefore setting in motion a virtuous circle capable to simultaneously control epidemics and 
fertility. 
    We did not explicitly include in the model the third challenge, namely the resistance issue. This 
was due to the lack of clear evidence on the magnitude of the phenomenon in SSA which prevented 
a meaningful parametrisation of it. Nonetheless, the widespread diffusion of resistance would 
simply worsen the control conditions of HIV/AIDS predicted by our model and ultimately the 
perspectives for economic development. 
    The list of possible future developments is clearly endless. A point of major interest in our 
research agenda regards the implications (in terms of both survival and education) for the children 
of adults prematurely dying of AIDS. In this regard, a naturally raising question is whether orphans 
suffer higher mortality and lower education opportunities than non-orphans (particularly in high-
prevalence HIV settings) and then how to build a proper model for this, for instance along the lines 
of the approach proposed by Bell and Gersbach (2013). In general, this is a complicate problem for 
the model considered in our chapter that cannot be solved simply by adding (endogenous) child 
mortality, as this is a general shortcoming of OLG settings regardless of whether fertility is 
endogenous (for instance, the UGT set up) or exogenous (Diamond, 1965). In fact, both frameworks 
did not account for an economically active childhood generation. In our opinion, a solution to the 
problem would require to fully account for the heterogeneity between HIV/AIDS-sick versus non-
sick parents and then accounting the possible different options available to, or behaviours of, 
children. This would imply at least the building of a heterogenous-agents OLG settings, with 
heterogenous utility functions in turn implying to also consider the effects of the peculiar socio-
cultural SSA settings, such as for example the presence or not of extended households, which can 
offer care to orphans. 
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Endnotes 
 
 
i On the demographic side, it should be recalled the work of Schoumaker (2009) pointing out that 
part of the fertility stall observed in SSA since the 2000 might partly be spurious due to data quality 
issues. Though clearly this is an important problem to be tackled in the future, we believe that the 
policy prescriptions of the present work are at all unaffected. 
 
ii We chose to define the public expenditure against HIV on a per worker basis rather than in per 
young terms (in line with the definitions of the other main variables used later in this work) for 
reasons of analytical tractability. 
 
iii We are aware that the assumption of perfect annuities does not perfectly describe the behaviour of 
intergenerational transmission of inheritance under uncertain survival in contexts such as SSA 
countries, as it is clearly well suited for settings where financial markets are adequately developed. 
However, the use of the alternative hypothesis of accidental bequests does not allow to characterise 
the behaviour of individual fertility and thus the dynamics of the physical to human capital ratio and 
the rate of HIV prevalence. 
 
iv The first order conditions define the optimal solution of the problem if and only if 1t    (this 
condition is assumed to hold throughout the work). As t  beta depends on the prevalence rate of 
HIV, which in turn may vary depending on internal and external resources aimed at fighting the 
disease, in our analysis we will use the most restricting assumption 1  . 
 
v The issue of contraception, which has been the object of a recent interest in development studies 
about the fertility transition in industrialised countries (Bhattacharya and Chakraborty, 2017; 
Prettner and Strulik, 2017) is of interest in relation to the interplay between HIV/AIDS and the 
fertility transition in SSA. Indeed, SSA is also characterised as the only region in the world where 
low levels of contraception are persisting (Greenwood et al., 2013) thus representing a main factor 
of the permanence of high fertility (Cleland, 2009). Therefore, the awareness of the risk of HIV 
might have an important by product in terms of fertility control. 
